Why Russia Invaded Ukraine

Russia has finally carried out its much-anticipated invasion of Ukraine. A move which has seen an assortment of reactions in the West, many have claimed that the action is confusing, unprovoked, and that Putin is a madman. This is simply a misrepresentation. The Western media has sought to paint a picture that this was an unexpected outcome of escalating tensions between Russia and the rest of Europe—it is not. 

The story begins with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Many senior party members in the Soviet leadership had come to realise that the Soviet experiment had failed. In 1990, then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Boris Yeltsin, was working to transition the economy from a command economy, where the means of production are publicly owned and allocated by the state, to a capitalist economy. It was a golden opportunity for the West to ‘come to the rescue’, to implement a policy akin to that of the Marshall plan to rebuild Europe after World War II, and create a friend in Russia rather than an adversary.

However, after the Soviet Union ended, Yeltsin, whose title became ‘President of Russia’, would oversee a catastrophic transition. Upon pulling down the Iron Curtain, many former state assets fell into the hands of oligarchs. Prices rose, salaries decreased, and the economy shrank massively for years. Not only this, but Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection was purportedly rife with corruption and moneyed interests. This was perhaps not the best possible introduction to Western values, with the newly Westernised Russia plundered by special interests and reaching levels of corruption that surpassed even the Soviet regime’s highs. To the people of Russia, many of whom had lost their savings, pensions, jobs, and homes, the West was no friend. In fact, very few attempts were made on the West’s part to make a friend of Russia at all, as it was too politically expedient to plunder their assets and maintain the historic opposition to the newly formed nation.

Another aspect, perhaps the most significant factor of all, is the expansion of NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an intergovernmental military alliance between European and American nations which became a formalised means of opposing the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO did not cease to be and arguably has remained to this day as an anti-Russian alliance. It is understandable then that Putin has been a vocal critic of countries on Russia’s borders joining NATO. One need only look at the Cuban Missile Crisis to see how the United States would react to such an imposition on national security under similar circumstances—so such concerns are not unfounded. Putin’s discomfort with NATO forces on Russia’s borders were echoed, as Peter Hitchens points out, by Russian liberal politician Yegor Gaidar—a man whom many Western leaders claim to admire. He accurately prophesied that such expansion would empower hardliners in the Kremlin. Even American diplomat George F. Kennan, who was the architect of the US’s policy of containment of the USSR, stated his disbelief at such expansion:

“I think it is the beginning of a new Cold War… I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves. We have signed up to protect a whole series of countries, even though we have neither the resources nor the intention to do so in any serious way. [Nato expansion] was simply a light-hearted action by a Senate that has no real interest in foreign affairs. What bothers me is how superficial and ill-informed the whole Senate debate was. I was particularly bothered by the references to Russia as a country dying to attack Western Europe. Don't people understand? Our differences in the Cold War were with the Soviet Communist regime.”

NATO expansion into Eastern Europe was and always has been a clear provocation to Russia. Nevertheless, careless American foreign policy has guided NATO, whom the hegemonic US are ultimately the masters of, into expanding into Eastern Europe seemingly for no reason. In February, 2019 the Ukrainian Constitution was amended to establish the course of Ukraine as a member of the European Union and of NATO—their intentions could not be more explicit. Putin’s continued objections to NATO membership expanding to ‘frontline’ countries have been consistently ignored.

Further compounding this, in July 2020 Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine created the Lublin Triangle initiative, which aims to create further cooperation between the three historical countries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and further Ukraine's integration and accession to the EU and NATO. This increasingly cosy relationship between Eastern European countries and NATO is often conveniently ignored by Western media warmongers and the US State Department, all of whom are keen to portray Putin as a madman or a rabid dog that must be put down. What we are now seeing is Putin calling the West’s bluff: we have sought to expand our influence provocatively to Russia’s very borders, and the invasion of Ukraine is, at least in part, a consequence of these actions.

Although it is difficult to gauge Russia’s intentions for the future of Ukraine and its lands, it is certainly clear that they will keep control of the Crimea. The Crimea has been in control of Russia since 1783 and was only transferred to Ukrainian control in 1956. The decision was only a matter of local administration as the whole of the USSR was still controlled by the Politburo in Moscow. Upon becoming independent in 1991, Ukraine took historically Russian lands, occupied by citizens who were majority ethnic Russian, whilst Russia was at its weakest. It is somewhat unsurprising that Russia has sought that land back, along with other Russian majority areas in Eastern Ukraine. It is only surprising it has taken this long. Assuming the Russian war effort continues, the question becomes whether Russia will install a puppet regime in Ukraine or simply annex the entire nation. Perhaps, although unlikely, the Ukrainians will hold out and eventually succeed in their defence. All possibilities are entirely unclear as of yet.

The intention here is not to apologise for Russian actions or justify their aggression, but merely to ensure that both sides of the conflict are sufficiently understood.