Factory Setting Policies and the Lockdowns

All political positions are not equal. In the public debate, some have a distinct upper hand, while others need to fight harder to become relevant, accepted, or popular. Reasons for this are numerous. Some views, for example, align with the institutional incentives of the people who propagate them - if something is in someone’s personal interest, they are more likely to do that than the opposite. Other views might have institutional backing - resources needed for its easier propagation or dissemination. Of course, there are many other such factors.

Here, though, I would like to discuss a specific, more psychologically-based phenomenon - factory setting policies. In its original context, the phrase ‘factory settings’ means the initial setup of a piece of hardware or software - it is the basic setting which the developer thought would be the most appropriate or the most useful for most users. Such settings can then typically be changed by the user, though that requires time and effort as well as some level of understanding regarding the options available and their effects.

The same is true in the sphere of politics. Politics also has its ‘factory settings’, and policies which have this elevated status enjoy an incredible advantage in the public debate.

When something becomes the default choice, it gains enormous power. In their famous book Nudge, Sunstein, a lawyer, and Thaler, a behavioural economist, explain just how significant a change of what constitutes a default status is, even if the choices overall are not restricted in any way. One example they use is becoming an organ donor. In both Austria and Germany, one can freely become an organ donor or decide not to be one. But in Germany, the default option is to not be a donor, and people can opt-in. Conversely, in Austria, one is an organ donor by default, with an option to opt-out anytime. The result? 12% of Germans were organ donors at the time of writing of the book, compared to 99% of Austrians.

People often do not care about the choices presented to them and choose to ignore the decision altogether, reverting to the default. This applies to politics and policies too - perhaps even to a greater extent. It takes a lot of time, effort, and interest for apolitical people to learn about political issues, and most people have other priorities in life, more important to them. Reverting to the default does not carry any social cost - after all, most people will do the same. Few will be questioned or confronted over a factory setting policy. But because almost everyone can become a voter, what becomes a factory setting policy is immensely important.

When a policy becomes the factory setting, it is widely accepted by the public. It is viewed as an automatic solution that can be applied when a specific problem arises. The public is not interested in whether the factory setting policy is, in fact, effective or not. It does not investigate whether it helps or hurts with the present situation. ‘The experts probably know what they’re doing. Who am I to say otherwise.’ 

Such presumption of the effectiveness of the factory setting policy has a significant effect on the discussion with its opponents. Because ‘we all know’ that the policy helps us deal with the problem, the opposition against the policy must think that the problem is overblown or does not exist at all and is simply made up. Otherwise, the opponent, too, would agree that the factory setting policy should be implemented.

What does this mean in practice?

After the 9/11 attacks, the domestic policy reaction was swift and strong. Over the following months and years, the US enacted reforms supposedly designed to protect its citizens and to make sure such an attack does not happen again - exemplified by the now-famous Patriot Act. The factory settings of the security issue are clearly visible in the thinking process behind the justification of these reaction-laws: ‘an attack has happened - more privacy restrictions make us more secure - these restrictions need to be enacted - if you are against more privacy restrictions, you must think that the terrorist threat is overblown. Well, if you think the threat is overblown, you are clearly crazy… have you not noticed the towers coming down?’ The disinterested factory setting policy supporter does not consider that the thought process of the opposition might be different. The discussion is steered away from the effectiveness of the policy towards questioning the original impulse for its implementation. Despite clear failures, such policies remain in place.

When the 07/08 financial crisis hit, the policy reaction was, again, swift and strong. Over the following months and years, most of the developed world enacted reforms supposedly designed to soften the fallout for its citizens and to make sure such a financial collapse does not happen again - exemplified by the now-famous Economic Stimulus Act and the EESA. The effects of the factory settings of economic issues kicked in: ‘an economic crash is looming - stimulus makes the economy better - the stimulus needs to be passed - if you are against the stimulus, you must think that the crisis is not as bad, that the effects will not be catastrophic, and that we can manage without the stimulus’. Again, the discussion is derailed from the question of whether stimulus policies actually help the economy and are an effective response to an economic crisis. Despite evidence to the contrary, these policies remain in place and are revived in future crises.

As COVID-19 spread around the world, the policy reaction was even swifter and even stronger. Over the following weeks and months, almost the entire world has enacted broad restrictions on whole economies and lives of their citizens supposedly designed to stop the spread of the virus. The very new and unprecedented idea of a lockdown quickly became the factory setting policy: ‘the virus is spreading - lockdowns help with the spread and slow down the virus - lockdowns need to be instituted - if you are against the lockdowns, you must think that the threat of the virus is overstated, or even that the whole thing is a hoax.’ The discussion of whether lockdowns are actually effective in stopping or slowing down the virus has almost disappeared, with most of the COVID-19 media and political coverage simply presuming that it is so - the hallmark of a factory setting policy. Despite apparent failures as well as horrific negative consequences, this policy remains in place across large parts of the world.

The political debate tied to factory setting policies affects their opponents personally as well. In response to being repeatedly told that they must doubt the validity of the threat justifying the policy in the first place, many of them fall into a ‘mind-trap’. They start to identify with the position being attributed to them - that the threat is not real or is overblown - even if that was not their view to begin with. 

This is underscored by the fact that when the two main sides of the debate become clearly delineated, the ‘threat denialist’ position becomes the only well-known, publicly articulated one that goes against the factory setting common knowledge. This effectively neutralizes the opposition arguing against the suitability of the factory setting policy itself.

A factory setting status attained by a given policy reverses the burden of evidence required of those involved in the public debate. Before lockdowns became a factory setting policy in response to a virus, they were, justifiably, seen as an unprecedented intrusion into people’s lives. Therefore, one needed to make the case for why they should be used despite being such drastic and in many ways harmful measures. After lockdowns became a factory setting policy, though, they automatically started to be seen as helpful in the fight against the spread of the virus. Therefore, if one wants to end them, one now needs to make the case for why they should not be enacted despite helping to eradicate the virus. 

In the context of public perception, once a factory setting status has been reached, it matters very little which of these default settings is more true or accurate. Not all political positions are on an equal footing. The cards have already been given out, and the players have to play the hands they’ve been given, or flip the table.